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1 Introduction
The Italian university system has been characterised for a long time by high
drop-out rates and long graduation times compared to other OECD countries.
In view of the progressive convergence towards an integrated labour market in
the EU, the need to increase the competitiveness of Italian graduates and to
harmonise the Italian system to the educational systems of other European
countries has emerged in recent years. For these reasons, in 2001 a ‘3+2’
(unitary two-tier) university system was introduced in Italy. A 3-year First
Level degree followed by a 2-year Second Level degree replaced a one-tier
system where the ‘old’ degree (Laurea) duration varied between a minimum
of four (e.g. economics) and a maximum of six years.
About four years since the introduction of the reform, there have been a
few attempts to analyse the current situation,1 but, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there has been no attempt to compare the situation before the reform
with the one that emerged after the reform, that is to evaluate the effects of
the 2001 reform. This lack of empirical analyses can be ascribed to various
reasons. Firstly, individual-level administrative datasets on university stu-
dents’ academic careers are not easily available to researchers (due to privacy
reasons) and rarely information is collected on students’ family backgrounds.
Secondly, an interest in monitoring the university system has developed in
Italy only in recent years. In particular, Law n. 370/1999 introduced a sys-
∗Preliminary. Comments are welcome. We wish to thank seminar participants at the
University of Milan and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1See for instance Boero et al. (2005), Broccolini and Staffolani (2005), Broccolini
(2005).
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tem for the evaluation of Italian universities that is formed by one central
institution, the Comitato Nazionale per la Valutazione del Sistema Univer-
sitario (Cnvsu), and several peripheral institutions, one for each university
(Nuclei di valutazione Interna degli Atenei). Last but not least, the uni-
versity reform was introduced in 2001, and the first ‘post-reform’ students
obtained their degrees in 2004. This is one of the problems for evaluating
the effects of the reform since most surveys conducted by Italian universities,
which also gather information on students’ family and academic backgrounds,
collect data only on graduates rather than on students.
The reform is likely to have produced several effects on the Italian univer-
sity system. Firstly, the reduction in the number of exams required to get an
undegraduate degree, generally corresponding to the reduction of one year
in the length of undergraduate studies, had huge effects on the number, and
probably the characteristics, of university students. Indeed, Italian universi-
ties generally registered a large increase in student numbers after the reform
and the reduction in the opportunity costs of studying might have increased
the participation in higher education of credit constrained individuals. Sec-
ondly, another possible effect of the reform concerns the common perception
that, irrespective of the reduced degree duration, the difficulty of university
courses in First level degrees reduced compared to the old undergraduate
qualification (the old Laurea).
In this paper we mainly focus on this second aspect, trying to assess
whether this common perception corresponds to reality. We use a data set
collecting information on all 3-year graduates (i.e. students who graduated
in the ‘new regime’) from the Faculty of Economics and Business of the
Marche Polytechnic University between 2003 and 2005 (that we call Survey
Graduates in Economics of Marche University, SGEMU hereafter). From the
population of graduates we select individuals who enrolled at university in a
time window centered around the year of the reform (i.e. 1999-2002). This
data set contains information, therefore, both on the students who passed
exams in the new regime (‘3+2’) and on those who passed exams in the old
regime (when the degree duration was 4 years). Our empirical strategy con-
sists in assessing the differences in course workloads required to pass exams
and in student performance indicators (such as grades, probability of pass-
ing exams, etc.) in first-year courses between the students enrolled before
the reform and those enrolled after the reform. In order to distinguish these
differences from the effects produced by changes in students’ characteristics
after the reform, we use propensity score matching (PSM) and match indi-
viduals who enrolled after the reform (treated) with those who enrolled before
the reform (control) with similar characteristics. The SGEMU data set also
enables us to compare the differences in the characteristics of 3-year gradu-
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ates enrolled before the reform with those of graduates enrolled after, which
are the result of the cumulative effects of the ‘3+2’ reform on enrollment
and drop-out rates.2 Unfortunately, SGEMU does not gather information on
graduates’ labour market outcomes and, for this reason, we are not able to
investigate the effects of the ‘3+2’ reform on the labour market. However,
in the last section of this paper we will put forward some possible labour
market implications of our empirical findings, which could be tested when
data become available.
Our paper aims only at being a first step towards a more extensive and
systematic evaluation of the effects of the ‘3+2’ reform and a monitoring of
the Italian university system that goes beyond the diffusion of raw descriptive
statistics. Although our paper features a case study, and evidence from the
Marche Polytechnic University cannot be straightforwardly generalised to the
whole Italian university system, our analysis is nonetheless informative given
the general lack of evaluation of the ‘3+2’ Italian university reform using
micro-level data. Our study might also be of interest to an international
audience since similar university reforms have been implemented in other
countries, and it would be interesting to compare evidence across countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section summarises the
characteristics of the Italian university system before the reform, the main
features of the 2001 reform and puts forward some expected effects of the
reform. Section 3 describes the methodology used in this paper, i.e. the
propensity score matching method, the data set and the estimation sample,
and finally reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 University reform in Italy
In this section we briefly describe the characteristics of the Italian university
system before the reform, the main features of the ‘3+2’ reform and its
expected effects on the behaviour of institutions and students.
2.1 The Italian university system before the reform
The Italian university system has recently experienced a huge process of
normative modification of many of its fundamental elements. Ministerial
decree n. 509/1999 introduced a new framework regarding the Italian higher
education system that came into effect in the academic year 2001/2002.
2However, SGEMU does not allow the analysis of changes in the characteristics of
entrant students.
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In the previous system, university studies were organized around only one
level of qualification, the Laurea degree, whose legal length varied between 4
and 6 years, depending on the field of study. Even after the introduction of
the postgraduate qualification, the Ph.D. programme, in 1980 (lasting three
years)3 and university diplomas (Diploma Universitario) in 1990 (2-3 years of
length and mainly of a vocational nature)4, the Laurea degree remained the
main higher education qualification, both at a social and academic level.5
Therefore, the architecture of the Italian undergraduate university system
before the reform was of a one-level type, although it allowed two paral-
lel academic routes, Diploma Universitario and Laurea: it was a ‘binary
one tier’ system. The structure of the Italian university system before the
2001 reform is shown in Figure 1. After higher secondary school students
could enrol either in degree (Laurea) or in diploma (Diploma Universitario)
courses. After obtaining a university degree students could enrol in Ph.D. or
in specialization courses.
Besides, there was a strong centralization of decision-making: the syllabus
for each single course was laid down at the national level by the National
University Council (Consiglio Nazionale Universitario).
The main goal of the reform was to solve some of the most critical prob-
lems of the Italian university. The Italian higher education system has always
been characterized firstly by a remarkable rigidity of curricula, secontly by a
mismatch between university education and qualifications and skills demand
of the labour market, thirdly by a large number of students who withdrew
from their studies and lastly by an actual time of graduation much longer
than in most other developed countries.
Furthermore, drop-out rates were particularly high during the first years
of degree courses: in the academic year 1999/2000, 20.3% of first year stu-
dents did not renew their enrolment in the second year.6 The Italian uni-
versity drop-out rate was the highest among the European countries: OECD
student survival rates7 in 2000 was the lowest for Italy (42%) compared to
an OECD average of 70% (70% for Germany, 59% for France, 83% for the
UK).8
3DPR 382/1980.
4Law n. 341/1990.
5During 1999, only 6% of the total of university students were studying for a Diploma
Universitario.
6Source: Miur Cnvsu (2005).
7Survival rates are calculated as the ratio of the number of students who are awarded
a degree to the number of new entrant students n years before, n being the number of
years of full-time study required to complete the degree.
8Source: OECD (2002).
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Figure 1: The Italian University system before the 2001 reform (“binary
one-tier system”)
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The percentage of graduates in the population aged 25-34 in Italy was
below 10% during 1999-2001, compared with an OECD average of 26% (22%
for Germany, 32% for France, 28% for the UK).9 In 1999, only 6.5% (7.3%
in 2000) of Italian graduates obtained the degree within the legal length of
the course, while more than 40.1% (40.2 in 2000) took 8 years or more to
graduate.10
The gap between actual and legal degree duration was partly due to the
high percentage of ‘inactive’ students - those who did not pass any exam
during a given academic year. In the academic year 1999/2000, for instance,
22.8% of Italian students were ‘inactive’.11
However, it must be noted that these dysfunctions were partly caused
by the didactic organization of Italian universities which remained largely
untouched by the reform. Indeed, Italian students are free to choose whether
to attend lectures and classes or not and when to sit exams. Courses are
usually assessed at the end of the teaching periods and exams can be repeated
9Source: OECD (2002).
10Source: Miur Cnvsu (2005).
11Source: Miur Cnvsu (2005).
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without limitations, in multiple alternative sessions during the same year or
the following academic years. Students can ‘refuse’ a mark in case they
are not satisfied with their performance in a specific exam and attempt the
exam in subsequent sessions. Exam failures are not usually registered in the
students’ records. Moreover, there are usually no constraints on the number
of exams to be passed in order to enrol in the following year.
2.2 Characteristics of the ‘3+2’ reform
Following the Sorbonne Joint Declaration (Paris, May 25 1998) and the
Bologna Declaration (June 19 1999),12 ministerial decree n. 509/99 produced
a radical transformation in the Italian university system, through three main
changes.
First of all, the reform has granted universities full teaching autonomy.
They can freely decide the names of the degree courses as well as their cur-
ricula.
Secondly, the most important innovation was represented by the intro-
duction of a ‘3+2’ scheme that replaced the old Laurea. The new academic
qualifications are organized around three main levels:
- First Level degrees (3 years of legal duration) that are supposed to
provide undergraduate students with adequate knowledge of general
scientific principles as well as specific professional skills;
- Second Level degrees (2 years of legal duration) that should provide
graduate students with advanced education and training for highly
qualified professions in specific sectors;13
- Ph.D. degrees (at least three years) that aim at training postgraduates
for highly specialized research.
The old university system was therefore transformed into a ‘unitary two-
tier’ system whose architecture is shown in Figure 2. After completing higher
secondary school students can now enrol in First Level degrees. After getting
a First Level degree students can enrol either in First Level Masters courses
or in Second Level degrees. After getting a Second Level Degree students can
enrol in Second Level Masters courses, in Ph.D. courses or in Specialization
courses.
12which promote the creation of a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) through
the harmonization of the different European educational systems.
13The articulation in a ‘3+2’ system does not apply to Medicine, Veterinary and Ar-
chitecture for which students directly enrol in Specialist degrees of six and five years,
respectively.
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Figure 2: The Italian University system after the 2001 reform (“unitary two-
tier system”)
The Italian University system after the 2001 reform (“unitary two-tier system”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher secondary school 
1st Level degrees 
(3 years) 
2nd Level degrees 
(2 years) 
1st 
level 
2nd 
level 
Schools of 
Specialization 
Ph.D. 
Master 
Finally, the reform introduced a system of university credits.14 Credits
represent the total student workload (including class time, self-study, prac-
tical activities, etc.) and they are obtained once a student has passed the
assessment for each course. Each credit corresponds to 25 hours of total
activities, and the average full-time workload for one academic year is 60
credits.
The main goals of the university reform were to bring the Italian higher
education system in line with the European university model and to promote
international student mobility. The introduction of a shorter degree course
aimed to increase the number of graduates, to lower their average age at
graduation and to reduce drop-out rates.
The improvement of universities’ ‘efficiency’ also grants greater financial
flows to higher education institutions. Law n. 370/1999 establishes that the
amount of public financing to each university is tied to specific parameters
of productivity, such as drop-out rates or students’ graduation times. Conse-
quently, a potential risk is the distortion of universities’ incentives produced
14The Italian university credit system is based on the European Credit Transfer System
(ECTS) implemented in the international student exchange programme ERASMUS.
7
by these funding rules. In other words, universities could be interested in
finding ways to simplify degree programmes in order to increase their ‘effi-
ciency’, reducing course workload or increasing grades, rather than improving
the quality of the educational services they provide, such as developing new
and more effective teaching strategies.15
2.3 Expected effects of the reform
Some possible effects of the ‘3+2’ reform are shown in Figure 3. First Level
degrees in Economics and Business Administration, for instance, have a du-
ration of three years while in the old regime the Laurea in the same field had
a duration of four years. This restructuring of university courses affected
the content of course programmes, generally determining shorter and often
simplified programmes. This had immediate consequences on the number
of students enrolled in first level degrees, which registered a steep increase
in the year of the introduction of the reform. In the Faculty of Economics
of the Marche Polytechnic University, for instance, the number of first year
enrolments rose by 28.3% in 2001/2002, while first year student growth rates
were 0.56% in 1999/2000, 4.7% in 2000/2001, 4.3% in 2002/2003 and 4.8% in
2003/2004.16 We expect that the reduction of course programmes along with
their simplification (since the main goal of the reform was to reduce drop-out
rates and graduation times) might also have had an effect on the character-
istics of university students (Figure 3, channel a). In particular, the reform
might have increased the probabilities of enrolment of relatively ‘weaker stu-
dents’, in terms of ability and motivation, of those that have less time to
devote to study, such as mature students, and of more risk adverse students,
such as those coming from lower social class backgrounds. This could have
produced further feedbacks in terms of behaviour of HE institutions, which
had to meet the needs of new ‘types’ of students, such as working students
or students with weaker academic backgrounds.
The behaviour of universities, in turn, affects student’s behaviour (Figure
3, channel b). Shorter and easier courses might have reduced the study and
attendance times required of students to pass an exam or to achieve a good
performance. The quality of the student intake also indirectly affects the
average student’s behaviour through ‘peer effects’. Study and attendance
times in turn affect student performance in terms of probability of passing
exams, speed of progression and grades (Figure 3, channel d). The latter
15This might have further negative consequences on the amount of skills that graduates
acquire through higher education and on the economic returns to university education in
the labour market.
16Source: www.cnvsu.it.
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Figure 3: An analytical framework for the effects of the Italian university
reform
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might also have been directly affected by the behaviour of universities, i.e.
university teachers might have become more generous to students irrespective
of the required course workloads (grade inflation), in the attempt to reduce
drop-out rates and increase the number of graduates (Figure 3, channel c).
We do not have enough data to investigate all the effects of the reform
and we will focus on channels a, b, c and d in Figure 3. In particular, we will
attempt to analyse the changes in the characteristics of university students
due to the ‘3+2’ reform using a probit analysis. The effects of the reform
on student behaviour, institution behaviour and student performance, which
represents the main focus of our analysis, will be assessed using propensity
score matching methods.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section we describe the methodology used in the empirical analysis,
the characteristics of the data set and the estimation sample, and comment
on the main results of the propensity score matching analysis.
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3.1 Behavioural and performance outcomes: propen-
sity score matching (PSM) analysis
We have seen in Figure 3 that the introduction of the ‘3+2’ reform might
have affected the behaviour of students and higher education institutions. In
this section we consider the five courses that are taught to first year under-
graduates at the Faculty of Economics of the Marche Polytechnic University
(Mathematics, Private Law, Economics, Accounting, Economic History) and
analyse the effect of the reform on the following student behavioural and
performance outcomes:
- course workloads, defined as the total number of hours that students
spent studying and attending lectures and classes in order to pass each
of the five first year exams (and the total workload for the five exams);
- grades obtained in each exam (and the average grade);
- probability of failing each first year exam at least once during the degree
course (and the total number of failures in first year exams, during the
whole degree length);
- probability of passing the exams in the first year (and the number of
first year exams passed in the first year).
In section 2.3 we have anticipated some possible effects of the reform.
The restructuring of the university courses might have:
- reduced the course workload required to pass the exams;
- increased the grades students receive since courses are now easier and/or
teachers are more “generous” to students (grade inflation);
- reduced the number of exams failed and increased the probability that
students pass the exams in the first year.
In order to analyse the causal effects of the reform, we use the propensity
score matching (PSM, hereafter) method. This method is now very pop-
ular, and we give only a brief introduction here. For a recent survey, the
interested reader is referred to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005). Two major
advantages of PSM with respect to traditional regression analysis are that,
in this specific context, it allows for heterogeneous effects of the university
10
reform (the ‘treatment’ in which we are interested) on individuals with differ-
ent observed characteristics17 and that it easily highlights eventual problems
of ‘common support’. These problems arise from the fact that the students
enrolled before and those enrolled after the reform may systematically differ
with respect to observable characteristics. In this case it might be difficult
to identify the effects of the reform, which can be confounded with those of
the change in students’ characteristics. PSM explicitly accounts for this by
matching ‘similar’ individuals (i.e. those with similar observable character-
istics) when computing the effect of the reform.
We define as Yi the outcome of interest (workload, grades, probability
of failing, probability to pass the exam in the first year), where i = 1, ...N
is the underscript for individuals. We want to estimate the causal effect
of a treatment Di, in our case the fact that a student enrolled after the
reform (Di = 1), on the various outcome variables. The treatment effect
for an individual i can be defined as τi = Yi(1) − Yi(0) where Yi(1) and
Yi(0) represent the outcomes of individual i when she receives the treatment
(Di = 1, ‘post-reform’ students) and when she does not receive it (Di = 0,
‘pre-reform’ students), respectively. The problem is that we observe the
student i and her outcome only in one of the two possible regimes and we
do not have the so called counter factual evidence, i.e. the outcome in the
unobserved regime.
We focus our attention here on the so called ‘average treatment effect on
the treated’ (ATT) which is defined as:
ATT = E(τi|Di = 1) = E[Yi(1)|Di = 1]− E(Yi(0)|Di = 1]. (1)
In this case we do not observe the counter factual E(Yi(0)|Di = 1] which is
necessary to compute ATT. Under some particular identifying assumptions,
we are able to compute ATT using the propensity score matching method.
The first identifying assumption is the so called Conditional Independence
Assumption (CIA):
Yi(0), Yi(1)⊥Di|Xi,∀Xi. (2)
which implies that selection into the treatment is solely based on observable
characteristics and there is no selection on unobservables. This is a very
strong assumption and is usually justified in terms of the richness of the
available data set. If the above condition holds and we define the propensity
17This can be obtained also in regression analyses by including interaction effects of
the ‘treatment’ with observable individual characteristics. However, given the very high
number of covariates to be included this is possible only when the sample size is large
enough.
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score as the probability of receiving the treatment conditional on the observ-
ables, i.e. P (Di = 1|Xi) = P (Xi) then the CIA based on the propensity
score (PS) also holds and can be written as:
Yi(0), Yi(1)⊥Di|P (Xi),∀Xi. (3)
A further condition (overlap condition) requires that the propensity score
must be comprised between 0 and 1, i.e. 0 < P (Xi) < 1, which ensures
that individuals with the same Xi have a non zero probability of being both
participants and non-participants (i.e. the observables Xi do not perfectly
predict the treatment status).
Given these assumptions, ATT can be estimated using different methods
of matching treated with untreated individuals. We consider in detail only
two specific ways of matching individuals which seem to be more suitable
to the characteristics of our data set, radius matching and kernel matching,
respectively:
- radius matching. Let us define as T the set of treated units and indicate
with C0(i) the set of control units (which may contain one or more
individuals) associated with individual i. With radius matching C(i) =
{P (Xj)| ‖P (Xj)− P (Xi)‖ < r}, that is all untreated individuals j with
a propensity score falling within a radius r from P (Xi) are matched
to the individual i. In this case ATT is computed according to the
following formula:
ATTradius =
1
NT
∑
i∈T
Y Ti − ∑
j∈C(i)
wijY
C
j
 (4)
where wij = 1/N
C
i are some weights, N
C
i is the number of control
units matched with i, NT the number of treated units, and Y Ti and
Y Cj the outcomes of treated and untreated individuals, respectively.
In the computation we impose common support by dropping treated
individuals whose PS is higher than the maximum or less than the
minimum PS of the controls. In our application, we specify quite a
small radius (r = 0.005) and in such a way, using only a relatively small
number of untreated individuals who are ‘very close’ to the treated ones
(i.e. in terms of the PS), we minimise the risk of bias in our estimate of
ATT at the cost of a high variance and the risk of obtaining statistically
insignificant estimates (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). These results
will then be compared with those obtained using kernel matching that
reduces the variance of the ATT estimate at the cost of a greater risk
of bias;
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- kernel matching. In this case ATT is computed as:
ATTkernel =
1
NT
∑
i∈T
[
Y Ti −
∑
j∈C Y
C
j G(
P (Xj)−P (Xi)
hn
)∑
j∈C G(
P (Xj)−P (Xi)
hn
)
]
(5)
where G(·) is a kernel function and hn a bandwidth parameter. We
impose common support and use the Gaussian type of kernel. This
type of matching uses all untreated individuals for each treated and
therefore uses a higher quantity of information with respect to radius
matching, reducing the variance of the estimated ATT but increasing
the risk of using untreated individuals who are ‘bad matches’. DiNardo
and Tobias (2001) show that the choice of kernel type is relatively
unimportant for the results which might instead be affected by the
bandwidth parameter, where a small bandwidth reduces the risk of bias
while increasing the variance of the ATT estimate. We chose optimal
bandwidth using cross-validation (see Ha¨rdle, 1991). The diagnostic
statistics reported for the PSM analysis in Appendix B show that the
optimal bandwidth parameter turns out to be quite small (ranging
between 0.04 and 0.06). Hence, also in the case of kernel matching our
estimates of the ATT should not be subject to a sizeable bias.
Black and Smith (2004) show that ATT estimates might be sensitive to
the covariates used in the estimation of the PS. In particular, if one uses
many variables in the computation of PS the CIA is more likely to hold.
However, the use of irrelevant variables (i.e. those not affecting outcomes
and/or treatment) for the computation of PS, wich will then be used to
match treated with control individuals, may produce ‘bad matches’ and in-
creases the variance of ATT estimates. For this reason, for both radius and
kernel matching we reported two sets of results, those produced using a base-
line specification including a large set of covariates for the computation of
the PS (labelled as ‘all’), and those obtained using only significant variables
or only variables marginally not significant at 10% statistical level (labeled
as ‘sig’).18 The baseline specification of the PS was estimated using a probit
model including grades obtained in the secondary school final exam, group
of surname, if applicable,19 age group, gender, type of secondary school,
residence in the province of Ancona20 before enrolment, distance from the
university during the degree course, working while studying, parents’ educa-
18For groups of categorical variables, such as parents’ education dummies, a joint sig-
nificance test was performed
19Since for some courses classes are split according to students’ surnames.
20The Marche Polytechnic University is located in the city of Ancona.
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tion and social classes, reason for enrolling at university. Some descriptive
statistics are reported in section 3.2.21
We have already stated that one of the identifying assumptions of using
the PSM method for computing ATT is that the treatment is not endoge-
nous, that is, the assignment to treatment only depends on variables that are
observable and that have been included in the estimation of the PS. In order
to assess the sensitivity of ATT estimates to this assumption, in particular to
the presence of one unobserved confounding variable which affects treatment
assignment, it is possible to use the method indicated by Rosembaum (2002).
Rosembaum’s method enables the researcher to build some bounds for the
significance levels of ATT in the case of endogenous self-selection into the
treatment status and according to different assumptions about the degree
of severity of the hidden bias. More in detail, for a given measure of the
bias Γ,22 which represents the difference in the odds of treatment due to the
unobserved variable, the method provides bounds for the p-value of the ATT
enabling the researcher to assess “the strength such unmeasured influences
would require in order that the estimated treatment effects from propensity
score matching would have arisen purely through selection effects” (DiPrete
and Gangl 2004, p. 14). It is important to note that Rosembaum’s bounds
represent worst case scenarios, i.e. they refer to the case in which one un-
observed variable not only has an effect on the PS but also on the outcome
so big so as to make the estimated effect spurious and only determined by
the unobserved heterogeneity.23 We run a sensitivity analysis by making Γ
varying from 1 to 3 with a step of 0.05.24
3.2 Data
An electronic questionnaire must be filled out by all the students of the
Faculty of Economics Marche Polytechnic University when they apply for
graduation. This survey (that we will call SGEMU, Survey Graduates in Eco-
nomics of Marche University) collects information on student backgrounds
(family, previous studies, age at enrolment etc.), student behaviour during
21We decided to drop out from the analysis the observations with missing values in
the explanatory variables which are used to compute the PS in order to avoid matching
individuals with missing information in the same variables, as, in reality, they may have
very different characteristics.
22Γ = 1 is the case of no hidden bias. Γ = 1.5, for instance, indicates that the unobserved
variable is responsible for 50% of the difference in the odds ratio of treatment.
23For a detailed description of the method see DiPrete and Gangl (2004).
24The p-value reported in the tables indicates the probability value at which the confi-
dence interval for the estimated ATT contains zero, it is p+ for positive effects and p− for
negative effects (see DiPrete and Gangl 2004).
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Table 1: Year of enrolment by year of graduation
year of graduation
year of enrolment 2003 2004 2005 Total
1999 109 0 0 109
2000 118 122 0 240
2001 0 123 169 292
2002 0 0 187 187
Total 227 245 356 828
studies (course attendance, time devoted to study, failures at exams, etc.)
and students’ opinions on the different aspects of university life. SGEMU
started in 2003 and has collected information on 1, 180 graduates since then.
Around 70% of graduates in the 2003-2005 period enrolled between 1999 and
2002. For obvious reasons of comparability, only students enrolled between
1999-2002 will be considered in our analysis.25
The SGEMU database collects information only on students who get a
First Level degree: drop outs, students who did not finish studies by 2005 and
those graduated with the old Laurea are excluded. Therefore, our analysis
is conditional on graduation with the new regime, i.e. we will compare the
behaviour and performance of ‘new graduates’ that enrolled in the two differ-
ent regimes (before and after reform, respectively).26 The reform might also
have had an effect on the probability of drop out, but we cannot investigate
these effects with the SGEMU data set.
Table 1 shows the composition of our sample. 828 students will be con-
sidered, 349 of them enrolled pre-reform and 479 enrolled after the reform.27
Some descriptive statistics of the variables we use to compute propensity
scores are presented in Table 2 that shows the percentage composition for
categorical variables and the average grade obtained in the secondary school
final exam (Maturita` grade).28 Some differences in the composition of grad-
25We do not consider students enrolled before 1999 because, due to the characteristics
of the data set, their studies last at least five years while students who enrolled after the
reform graduated in less than five years.
26In this respect, in the educational production context, our analysis is equivalent of the
analyses that use PSM to estimate wage returns to education and focus only on employed
individuals (see, for instance, Blundell et al., 2005).
27Students enrolled before 2001 could decide either to continue studies with the old
regime, based on a legal length of four years, or to switch to the new regime (based
on a legal length of three years and requiring a lower number of exams). We analysed
the probability to switch to the new regime (see Appendix A), finding that the main
explanatory variable is the year of enrolment, so that ‘old’ students whose academic careers
were nearly finished preferred to remain in the ‘old’ system.
28In Italy students at the end of upper secondary education have to pass an exam called
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uates enrolled before and after the reform seem to emerge: for instance, in
academic years 2001 and 2002 women, children of blue collar parents and
students coming from schools different from liceo showed an increase in their
enrolment rates. 29
According to Becker’s human capital theory (Becker, 1964) individuals
self-select into higher education on the basis of their costs and returns, which
depend on observed characteristics such as their family background. If none
of these observed characteristics has a significant impact on the probability
of enrolling at university before vs. after the reform, it is likely that the
reform did not change the costs and the returns of higher education and had
no effect on the characteristics of universities’ student intake. By contrast,
if we observe some significant differences in students’ characteristics before
and after the reform, we think that they are likely to be mainly produced by
the reform since other mechanisms, such as changes in the labour market,
are likely to operate much more slowly and require more than three years
(1999-2001) to affect the costs and the returns of higher education.
Estimating a probit model where the dependent variable is the probabil-
ity to enrol after the reform, some of the explanatory variables turns out to
be statistically significant as Table 3 shows. The probit model of Table 3
includes only significant variables: Maturita` grade and type of higher sec-
ondary school, distance between the student’s residence and faculty, father’s
education and work and mother’s education. Results show that students
with a higher Maturita` grade, older students, those coming from languages,
arts and education, those who do not work full time, those coming from more
educated families, children coming from higher social classes, are more likely
to have enrolled after the reform.30 Therefore, graduates from the Faculty
‘Esame di Maturita`’ in which they receive a final grade ranging between 60 and 100. Before
the reform of the ‘Esame di Maturita`’ (Law n. 425/1997), the grade ranged between 36
and 60. For reasons of comparability the final grade of ‘new’ secondary school graduates
was converted into the ‘old’ scale.
29In Italy there are various types of higher secondary schools. We grouped under ‘tech-
nical schools’, those schools which mainly give vocational and technical education, Istituti
Tecnici Industriali, Istituti Tecnici per Geometri and Istituti Professionali. The group ‘ac-
counting’ comprises Istituti Tecnici Commerciali and offers vocational education mainly in
the fields of accounting and business. Licei are the schools that give a general type of ed-
ucation and that are usually chosen by individuals who plan to go on to higher education.
Liceo classico mainly gives ‘classical’ education (for instance students study ancient Greek
and Latin) while in liceo scientifico emphasis is on quantitative disciplines. In the last
group, ‘languages, arts and education’ we have grouped Licei Linguistici, Licei Artistici,
Istituti d’Arte and Scuole Magistrali.
30Since we consider only students who graduated in three or four years before and after
reform, it is likely that some of the counter-intuitive effects we find are determined by the
differential effect of the reform on the probability of graduation and on graduation times
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Table 2: Graduates’ characteristics before and after the reform (%)
Variables pre-post reform
Age at enrolment pre-reform post-reform Total
less than 19 26.6 28.6 27.8
19 61.3 57.0 58.8
20 7.4 5.2 6.2
21 1.4 3.8 2.8
22 or more 3.2 5.4 4.5
Sex pre-reform post-reform Total
men 37.2 30.3 33.2
women 62.8 69.7 66.8
Father’s education pre-reform post-reform Total
no or elementary school 19.2 15.1 16.8
lower secondary school 28.8 31.2 30.2
higher secondary school 38.7 38.6 38.7
degree 13.4 15.1 14.3
Mother’s education pre-reform post-reform Total
no or elementary school 19.9 16.4 17.9
lower secondary school 28.1 32.3 30.5
higher secondary school 40.4 37.1 38.5
degree 11.7 14.2 13.2
Father’s occupation pre-reform post-reform Total
entrepreneur, manager 12.0 17.7 15.3
independent worker 12.0 13.8 13.0
white collar 22.1 15.0 18.0
blue collar 10.6 16.9 14.3
other 43.3 36.5 39.4
Mother’s occupation pre-reform post-reform Total
entrepreneur, manager 4.6 4.0 4.2
independent worker 7.2 6.1 6.5
white collar 31.8 28.4 29.8
blue collar 14.0 17.1 15.8
housewife 27.8 23.0 25.0
other 14.6 21.5 18.6
Type of higher secondary school type pre-reform post-reform Total
technical 6.1 6.7 6.4
accounting 38.3 43.5 41.3
liceo classico 8.1 5.3 6.4
liceo scientifico 41.5 30.7 35.2
languages, arts, education 6.1 13.9 10.6
Residence at less than one hour during studies pre-reform post-reform Total
more than 75% 68.7 79.3 74.1
between 50% and 75% 6.9 7.4 7.2
between 25% and 50% 13.6 2.0 6.9
less than 25% 10.8 11.3 11.1
Work while studying pre-reform post-reform Total
full time, continuously 10.7 3.2 6.4
part time, continuously 11.8 12.7 12.3
seasonally, temporarily 45.0 49.4 47.5
never worked 32.5 34.7 33.8
Resident in Ancona province pre-reform post-reform Total
no 42.7 44.1 43.5
yes 57.3 55.9 56.5
Maturita` grade (higher secondary school) out of 60 pre-reform post-reform Total
grade 51.6 52.1 51.9
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of Economics of the Marche Polytechnic University who graduated in three
or four years and who enrolled before the reform appear to differ from those
who graduated in the same time but enrolled after the reform according to
various observed characteristics.
As we said above, SGEMU offers information on student performance and
behaviour. In particular, for each course of the first year31 there are data
on:32
- hours spent attending the courses;
- hours devoted to self-study;
- grades obtained;
- exams failed;
- month and year in which the exam was passed
Table 4 shows these data,33 distinguishing between students enrolled be-
fore and after the university reform.
It clearly emerges that the first year became easier (second column):
workload reduced, the average grade increased, the number of exams failed
reduced and the number of exams passed during the first year increased.
of students with different characteristics.
31At the Faculty of Economics of Marche Polytechnic University, first year exams are
common to all students. These exams are: Mathematics, Private Law, Economics, Ac-
counting, Economic History. Each course gives 10 credits to students, equivalent to 250
hours of total workload. During the first year, students should also pass two “qualifica-
tions” in computer use and the English language, which give five credits each.
32All this information is retrospective, and like in any other retrospective survey, data
may be affected by memory recollection errors. In Italy university students have a per-
sonal university booklet in which the dates and grades of the exams passed are recorded.
Therefore, it is likely that students checked their booklets when answering to SGEMU.
However, for the first two pieces of information data may be subject to serious measure-
ment errors. In particular, a possible objection is that post-reform students who do not
remember workloads tend to declare workloads that corresponds to ‘nominal workloads’
(i.e. the number of credits multiplied by 25 hours, which is the equivalent of one credit).
If students behave in this way, we should consistently observe similar workloads in all
exams (as each exam gives 10 credits and data refer to the same graduates). However, the
reader can check from the column ‘treated avg’ in Tables 6-11 that post-reform students’
workloads differ across exams. Moreover, also pre-reform students might behave in the
same way, but this is not the case as suggested by the colunmn ‘untr. avg’ in Tables 6-11.
33The variable workload is obtained by summing the time spent attending the courses
and the time spent studying.
18
Table 3: Probit estimates of graduates’ probability to have enrolled
after university reform
Variables Marg. Eff. s.e.
Maturita` grade 0.00 * 0.00
Age (less than 19)
19 -0.04 0.04
20 -0.08 0.08
21 0.19 * 0.10
22 or more 0.18 ** 0.08
School (technical)
accounting 0.06 0.08
liceo classico -0.13 0.10
liceo scientifico -0.07 0.08
languages, arts, education 0.15 * 0.08
Time to get to faculty more than 1h
(more than 75% of the duration)
between 50% and 75% 0.02 0.07
between 25% and 50% -0.38 *** 0.06
less than 25% -0.05 0.06
Work while studying (full time, continuously)
part time, continuously 0.21 ** 0.09
seasonally, temporarily 0.24 *** 0.08
never worked 0.24 *** 0.08
Father’s education (no or elementary school)
lower secondary school 0.08 0.06
higher secondary school 0.11 * 0.06
degree 0.15 * 0.08
Father’s occupation (entrepreneur, manager)
independent worker -0.01 0.07
white collar -0.14 ** 0.06
blue collar -0.00 0.07
other -0.08 0.06
Mother’s education (no or elementary school)
lower secondary school 0.03 0.06
higher secondary school 0.02 0.06
degree 0.07 0.08
No. obs. 728
Pseudo R2 0.093
Prob > χ2 0.00
Note. Reference categories for categorical variables are reported in brackets.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics: student behaviour and performance
Overall / Maths Accounting Econ. Pr. Law Ec. Hist.
Workload
pre-reform 1254.34 267.52 212.66 275.45 321.88 170.15
post-reform 1126.29 246.72 215.06 248.09 245.08 171.97
Total 1181.82 255.76 214.02 260.40 278.56 171.16
Grade
pre-reform 24.94 24.26 26.55 24.55 23.98 25.38
post-reform 25.98 24.74 27.41 25.75 25.65 26.36
Total 25.78 24.65 27.24 25.52 25.32 26.16
No. of failures / prob. of failing
pre-reform 1.27 0.28 0.10 0.33 0.12 0.02
post-reform 0.73 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.02
Total 0.96 0.21 0.08 0.29 0.10 0.02
No. of exams passed in the 1st year / prob. of success in the 1st year
pre-reform 4.02 0.73 0.86 0.68 0.75 0.95
post-reform 4.32 0.90 0.94 0.83 0.71 0.94
Total 4.19 0.82 0.91 0.76 0.73 0.94
There was a reduction in student workload in Maths, Economics and
Private Law in the post-reform period and it is now at around 250 hours.34
In Maths, Accounting and Economic History grades seem to have increased
after the reform. For all courses, except Economic History, students show
a lower probability of failing and a higher probability of passing the exams
in the first year. In particular, a higher probability of passing first year
exams during the first year should imply, ceteris paribus, a lower probability
of dropping out and a shorter time needed to get a degree, in line with the
aims of the reform.
3.3 The sample
Our aim is to evaluate the effects of the ‘3+2’ university reform on student
behaviour and performance. In section 3.2, we defined as being ‘pre-reform’
(i.e. non-treated) those students who enrolled before 2001 and ‘post-reform’
those students who enrolled in 2001 or later. Some problems related to this
definition emerge in the empirical analysis.
A first problem arises for courses taught by different professors before and
after the reform. In this case, the effects of the reform are indistinguishable
from the effects arising from the changing of professors. Thus, in the propen-
sity scores matching analysis, we preferred not to consider students who, in a
given course, had a professor who taught only before or only after the reform.
34According to the Italian legislation, 250 hours is exactly the amount of workload for
each exam. Therefore, the five exams presented in Table 4 should require a total workload
of 1250 hours.
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Table 5: Number of observations in the different samples used for
propensity score matching
Exams All Same teacher Exams passed
pre and post reform during 1st year
Mathematics 828 705 360
Private Law 828 712 287
Economics 828 547 335
Accounting 828 767 378
Economic History 828 828 379
Therefore the 828 students35 in Table 1 will be used for analysis concerning
the ‘overall’ first academic year, whereas our sample will be composed of the
observations in the third column of Table 5 when individually analysing the
various exams.
A second problem arises for ‘pre-reform’ students who passed some of
the exams in the post-reform regime. These students probably attended pre-
reform courses but passed the exam in the post-reform regime, so that there
is no clear way of defining the treatment. To overcome this problem we use
two different samples in the estimation:
- we first analyse all students described in the third column of Table 5,
defining the treatment status according to students’ years of enrolment;
- we then analyse only those students who are in the ‘pure’ pre-reform
or the ‘pure’ post-reform regime, that is only those individuals who
enrolled before 2001 and passed the exam in the first year and those
who enrolled after 2001 and passed the exam in the first year, respec-
tively. In this case, the number of observations in our sample is strongly
reduced as indicated in the fourth column of Table 5.
3.4 Results of PSM analysis
Tables 6-11 report the results of the PSM analysis both for single first year
exams and for the whole first year.
Mathematics represents, in the opinion of students, one of the most dif-
ficult first year exams. Our analysis suggests a reduction in the workloads
(study and attendance times) required of students to pass the exam. This
finding is robust across different methods of matching treated with control
individuals and different specifications of the PS. In particular, when using
radius matching and the complete specification of the PS, the reduction in
35Those who completed their studies in 3 or 4 years.
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workload is about 51 hours (-17%), significant at 5%, and rises to 55 hours (-
18%) when only significant variables are included in the PS, significant at 1%
level. ATT estimated using kernel matching varies between -15% in the full
specification and -17% in the specification including only significant variables
and turns out to be significant at least at 5% level. There is no effect of the
reform on the average grade in Mathematics. The effects on the probability
of having failed the exam at least once during the whole degree course and
of passing the exam in the first year are more substantial. Reduction in the
first student performance indicator is always significant at the 5% level and
ranges between -39% and -45% while the increase in the second indicator is
always significant at the 1% level and ranges between 21% and 28%. There-
fore, the effect of the reform was particularly strong in Mathematics, one of
the first year exams in which many students experience major difficulties:
the hours workload reduced, the probability of failing the exam at least once
dropped and that of passing the exam in the first year increased. Since the
workload reduced, we cannot judge if the increase in all student performance
indicators was mainly due to the reduced effort required of students or by a
more generous attitude of teachers who inflated grades after the reform, or
due to a mix of the two. However, the fact that the average grade did not rise
after the reform make us to propend for the first explanation. One thing is
clear, since by using PSM we estimate the effect of the reform matching very
similar individuals, accounting therefore for differences in observable student
characteristics across the two regimes, such as ability (Maturita` grade) and
academic readiness (type of secondary school), it is likely that the reduction
in workloads leads into a reduction of the amount of ‘knowledge’ (i.e. human
capital) that the students possess.
Private Law was one of the exams with the biggest workload before the
reform. Table 7 shows a significant reduction in the workload. The estimates
are surprisingly robust across methods and specifications of the PS and range
between -17% (53 hours) and -18% (58 hours) with respect to the period
before the reform, generally significant at the 1% level. Our estimates show
no effect on the average grade, except in the case of kernel matching with only
significant variables, in which case ATT shows a 3.2% increase in the average
mark. The reform had no effect on the probability of experiencing more
than one fail and had a counter-intuitive negative effect on the likelihood of
passing the exam in the first year, ranging between -12% and -14%. Given
the evidence on the likelihood of exam failures after the reform, which did not
rise, this might perhaps be due to the different strategies followed by students
who after the reform might have been relatively more likely to attempt this
exam after the first year.
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Table 6: Propensity score matching - Mathematics
methods/ treated untr. n. Opt. R-bounds(e)
variables ATT s.e.(a) avg(b) avg(c) obs. bandw.(d) Γ p-value
Workload
radius/all -50.7 ** 22.9 251 302 518 - 2.10 0.12
kernel/all -44.8 ** 19.5 246 291 518 0.06 2.80 0.11
radius/sig -55.1 *** 21.3 246 302 525 - 2.25 0.12
kernel/sig -51.3 *** 18.8 245 297 525 0.06 (§) (§)
Grade
radius/all -0.19 0.54 24.73 24.92 520 - - -
kernel/all 0.48 0.44 24.86 24.37 520 0.06 - -
radius/sig 0.28 0.51 24.71 24.43 527 - - -
kernel/sig 0.39 0.42 24.84 24.44 527 0.06 - -
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.11 ** 0.06 0.16 0.28 606 - 2.15 0.12
kernel/all -0.11 ** 0.05 0.18 0.28 606 0.06 1.90 0.13
radius/sig -0.13 ** 0.06 0.16 0.30 617 - 2.35 0.12
kernel/sig -0.13 ** 0.05 0.17 0.30 617 0.06 1.95 0.14
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.16 ** 0.06 0.90 0.74 525 - (§) (§)
kernel/all 0.19 *** 0.06 0.90 0.72 525 0.06 (§) (§)
radius/sig 0.20 *** 0.06 0.92 0.72 532 - (§) (§)
kernel/sig 0.20 *** 0.05 0.90 0.70 532 0.06 (§) (§)
Note. The number of observations may change across analyses due to the different number of missing
values in the outcome variables.
(a) Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 replications).
(b) Averages of outcome variables for treated individuals.
(c) Averages of outcome variables for untreated individuals.
(d) The optimal bandwidth for the Gaussian kernel matching was selected using cross-validation (see
Ha¨rdle, 1991).
(e) The Γ for the Rosembaum’s bounds refers to the first value for which the estimated ATT is not
significant at the 10% statistical level while the p-value reports the corresponding probability value. Γ
and p-value are reported only for ATT estimates significant at least at the 1′% level.
(§) ATT estimate turns out to be significant at the 10% statistical level also for Γ = 3.
∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 10%.
Economics,36 like Mathematics, is an exam with a quantitative content
and reputed as quite difficult by students. Our estimates generally suggest a
reduction in workload of the magnitude of 11-14%. ATT estimates including
only significant variables in the PS are usually more significant. The reform
had no effect on the average grade. As in Mathematics, we register a sizeable
and generally statistically significant reduction in the probability of at least
one fail, which ranges between 25-35% and a remarkable increase in the
probability of passing the exam in the first year ranging between 15-23%. For
Economics, as for Mathematics, it is not possible to say whether the increase
in student performance was mainly driven by a reduction in the amount of
material to be studied (workload) or by a reduction in the difficulty of the
exam irrespective of workloads, i.e. by an increase in teachers’ generosity.
However, also in this case, as for Mathematics, since average grades did not
36The first year Economics exam corresponds to Microeconomics.
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Table 7: Propensity score matching - Private Law
methods/ treated untr. n. Opt. R-bounds(e)
variables ATT s.e.(a) avg(b) avg(c) obs. bandw.(d) Γ p-value
Workload
radius/all -53.4 ** 22.0 265 318 540 - 2.10 0.12
kernel/all -57.8 *** 17.8 260 317 540 0.05 2.70 0.12
radius/sig -56.9 *** 19.9 261 318 547 - 2.30 0.12
kernel/sig -55.4 *** 16.3 260 316 547 0.04 2.70 0.11
Grade
radius/all 0.32 0.44 25.47 25.15 543 - - -
kernel/all 0.59 0.36 25.47 24.87 543 0.05 - -
radius/sig 0.54 0.42 25.42 24.89 550 - - -
kernel/sig 0.78 ** 0.34 25.44 24.68 550 0.04 1.50 0.11
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.09 621 - - -
kernel/all -0.00 0.03 0.09 0.09 621 0.05 - -
radius/sig -0.05 0.04 0.09 0.14 632 - - -
kernel/sig -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.11 632 0.04 - -
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all -0.11 * 0.06 0.64 0.74 549 - 1.05 0.16
kernel/all -0.10 ** 0.05 0.64 0.74 549 0.05 1.25 0.16
radius/sig -0.08 0.05 0.64 0.72 556 - - -
kernel/sig -0.11 ** 0.04 0.64 0.74 556 0.04 1.25 0.13
Note. See Table 6.
change after the reform we prefer the first explanation.
Accounting and Economic History were the exams with the lowest levels
of workloads before the reform and the highest probability of passing at the
first attempt. For such exams, we would expect a lower impact of the reform
whose main aims were, as we said, to reduce drop-out rates and graduation
times. Indeed, in Accounting we do not register any effect on workloads that
remained the same after the reform. However, grades increased between 1.4
and 2 per cent (generally significant at the 5% level) while the effect on the
likelihood of passing the exam in the first year is positive but generally not
statistically significant. In this case a possible interpretation of our results
is that after the reform teachers were more generous to students, mainly
inflating grades.
Also in Economic History the reform produced no effect on workloads, on
the probability of one or more failures and on that of passing the exam in the
first year. It is interesting to observe that in this course failure was pratically
inexistent before the reform and that most students passed the exam in the
first year. The only effect produced by the reform was an increase in the
average grades received by students of 1.9-2.9% (generally significant at 5%
level). In this case, therefore, as in Accounting, the reform seems to have
mainly produced grade inflation, without affecting the likelihood of failing
or the probability of passing the exam in the first year, since most students
used to pass the exam at their first attempt during the first year already
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Table 8: Propensity score matching - Economics
methods/ treated untr. n. Opt. R-bounds(e)
variables ATT s.e.(a) avg(b) avg(c) obs. bandw.(d) Γ p-value
Workload
radius/all -31.0 21.5 256 287 425 - - -
kernel/all -30.7 * 16.0 250 280 425 0.06 2.15 0.12
radius/sig -39.0 ** 19.9 246 285 434 - 1.80 0.11
kernel/sig -32.1 ** 14.2 249 281 434 0.06 2.25 0.12
Grade
radius/all -0.08 0.58 25.84 25.92 433 - - -
kernel/all 0.28 0.42 25.93 25.65 433 0.06 - -
radius/sig 0.05 0.53 25.83 25.78 442 - - -
kernel/sig 0.37 0.37 25.96 25.60 442 0.06 - -
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.12 * 0.07 0.24 0.37 475 - 1.55 0.12
kernel/all -0.13 ** 0.05 0.23 0.35 475 0.06 1.25 0.13
radius/sig -0.09 0.07 0.25 0.34 486 - - -
kernel/sig -0.12 ** 0.05 0.23 0.35 486 0.05 1.25 0.12
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.14 * 0.07 0.84 0.70 430 - 1.90 0.11
kernel/all 0.16 *** 0.06 0.85 0.69 430 0.06 2.10 0.13
radius/sig 0.11 0.07 0.85 0.74 439 - - -
kernel/sig 0.14 *** 0.05 0.85 0.70 439 0.05 2.15 0.13
Note. See Table 6.
before the reform. Another thing worth noting is that, although 10 credits
have been attributed to the course, its workload is well below the measure
of 250 hours.
When we consider the overall performance in the five first year exams all
effects are highly statistically significant and go in the expected direction:
- first year workload reduced between 10 and 11 per cent. This roughly
corresponds to 5 credits, that is to half of a first year exam;
- the average grade in first year exams increased between 2.2 and 2.8 per
cent;
- the total number of first year exams failed reduced between 38 and 48
per cent;
- the total number of exams passed in the first year increased between
7.6 and 8.5 per cent.
The optimal bandwidths for kernel matching selected by cross-validation
are quite small (ranging between 0.04 and 0.06). Therefore also ATT com-
puted with this method is likely to suffer from a small bias. Rosembaum
bounds usually show that ATT estimates turn out to be quite robust in the
presence of one unobserved variable affecting both the probability of treat-
ment and the outcomes.
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Table 9: Propensity score matching - Accounting
methods/ treated untr. n. Opt. R-bounds(e)
variables ATT s.e.(a) avg(b) avg(c) obs. bandw.(d) Γ p-value
Workload
radius/all 3.3 12.2 215 212 583 - - -
kernel/all 5.7 9.4 214 209 583 0.05 - -
radius/sig 5.0 11.6 215 210 590 - - -
kernel/sig 6.4 8.8 214 208 590 0.05 - -
Grade
radius/all 0.38 0.28 27.41 27.04 585 - - -
kernel/all 0.43 ** 0.21 27.40 26.97 585 0.06 1.55 0.14
radius/sig 0.55 ** 0.27 27.43 26.88 592 - 1.55 0.12
kernel/sig 0.48 ** 0.21 27.41 26.93 592 0.05 1.60 0.11
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 669 - - -
kernel/all -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 669 0.05 - -
radius/sig -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 680 - - -
kernel/sig -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 680 0.04 - -
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.05 0.04 0.92 0.87 592 - - -
kernel/all 0.05 0.03 0.93 0.88 592 0.05 - -
radius/sig 0.05 0.03 0.93 0.88 599 - - -
kernel/sig 0.05 * 0.03 0.93 0.88 599 0.05 (§) (§)
Note. See Table 6.
Table 10: Propensity score matching - Economic History
methods/ treated untr. n. Opt. R-bounds(e)
variables ATT s.e.(a) avg(b) avg(c) obs. bandw.(d) Γ p-value
Workload
radius/all 5.4 9.1 175 170 635 - - -
kernel/all -0.2 7.2 171 172 635 0.05 - -
radius/sig -10.5 8.6 173 183 644 - - -
kernel/sig -3.0 7.0 171 174 644 0.05 - -
Grade
radius/all 0.75 ** 0.33 26.45 25.70 651 - 1.55 0.12
kernel/all 0.56 ** 0.27 26.43 25.86 651 0.05 1.55 0.12
radius/sig 0.65 ** 0.32 26.42 25.77 660 - 1.50 0.14
kernel/sig 0.48 * 0.26 26.44 25.95 660 0.05 1.70 0.13
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 718 - - -
kernel/all -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 718 0.05 - -
radius/sig -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 730 - - -
kernel/sig -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 730 0.04 - -
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all -0.03 0.02 0.95 0.98 647 - - -
kernel/all -0.02 0.02 0.94 0.96 647 0.05 - -
radius/sig -0.03 0.02 0.94 0.97 656 - - -
kernel/sig -0.03 0.02 0.94 0.97 656 0.05 - -
Note. See Table 6.
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Table 11: Propensity score matching- All 1st year exams
methods/ treated untr. n. Opt. R-bounds(e)
variables ATT s.e.(a) avg(b) avg(c) obs. bandw.(d) Γ p-value
Workload
radius/all -129.5 ** 53.1 1133 1262 618 - 1.85 0.13
kernel/all -144.8 *** 44.5 1120 1266 618 0.05 2.30 0.11
radius/sig -143.7 *** 51.9 1122 1266 626 - 2.05 0.12
kernel/sig -143.3 *** 42.8 1118 1262 626 0.05 2.35 0.14
Grade
radius/all 0.56 ** 0.24 26.10 25.54 621 - 1.50 0.13
kernel/all 0.58 *** 0.18 26.06 25.49 621 0.05 1.70 0.14
radius/sig 0.70 *** 0.22 26.07 25.36 629 - 1.70 0.10
kernel/sig 0.56 *** 0.18 26.06 25.51 629 0.05 1.65 0.13
Total number of failures
radius/all -0.44 *** 0.16 0.73 1.17 718 - 2.35 0.13
kernel/all -0.47 *** 0.13 0.74 1.22 718 0.05 (§) (§)
radius/sig -0.65 *** 0.16 0.70 1.35 730 - (§) (§)
kernel/sig -0.48 *** 0.12 0.73 1.22 730 0.04 (§) (§)
N. of exams passed in the first year
radius/all 0.34 *** 0.10 4.33 3.99 627 - 2.30 0.12
kernel/all 0.34 *** 0.08 4.33 4.00 627 0.05 2.15 0.10
radius/sig 0.30 *** 0.09 4.33 4.03 635 - 1.95 0.11
kernel/sig 0.31 *** 0.07 4.33 4.02 635 0.05 1.60 0.11
Note. See Table 6.
In Appendix B, we report some diagnostic statistics for the matching
procedure. In all cases the matching procedure produced quite satisfactory
results, as shown by the reduction in the Pseudo R2 of the probit model for
treatment status before and after matching, the lack of joint significance of
the covariates used for the estimation of the propensity scores and the sizeable
reduction in the median bias after matching. All these diagnostics show that
the covariates were well balanced between the two samples of treated and
untreated individuals after matching.
3.5 An alternative definition of the treatment status
In the previous section, we considered individuals who enrolled after 2001
as ‘treated’. This definition of treatment may pose some problems for the
evaluation of the effect of the reform on workloads, grades and the probability
of more than one failure since those students who enrolled before 2001 might
have attempted and passed the exam in the new regime, i.e. after the reform.
Therefore, some individuals who enrolled before 2001 may also have benefited
from the reform. This suggests that the effects we estimated in the previous
section might be lower bound estimates since some ‘treated’ individuals might
have been matched with individuals who, although enrolling before 2001,
passed the exams after the reform. However, we do not evidently have this
problem when assessing the effect of the reform on the probability of passing
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the exams in the first year.
In Appendix C, we estimated the effect of the reform, i.e. having enrolled
after 2001, only on individuals who passed the exams in the first year. When
considering only this group we do not have the problem that some individuals
enrolling before the reform passed the exam after the reform, however, the
ATT we estimate may be different from that of the previous section because
we consider relatively abler or more motivated individuals here. Moreover,
given the small sample size, a caliper of 0.005 is probably too small and we
will be unlikely to obtain significant estimates with radius matching. We
report only the analysis on single exams and do not report the analysis on
all first-year exams due to the very low number of individuals who passed all
first-year exams in the first year.
For Mathematics we observe a reduction in workload generally significant
at the 10% level when using kernel matching. The reduction is lower than
that estimated in the previous section and ranges between 23 and 38 hours.
There are no other statistically significant effects.
For Private Law we estimate a highly statistically significant reduction
in workloads ranging between 22% and 25%, bigger than that estimated in
the previous section.
For Economics we do not observe any statistically significant effect.
Finally both for Accounting and Economic History we estimate an in-
crease in average grades ranging between 1.9% and 2.2% and 1.9% and 2.6%,
respectively, generally statistically significant.
Therefore, the analysis restricted to individuals who passed the exams
in the first year qualitatively confirms the findings of the previous section,
although, as expected, the significance of the estimated ATT tends to fall.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we used propensity score matching to evaluate the effects of
the ‘3+2’ university reform on student academic behaviour and performance
introduced in Italy in 2001. We used data on graduates (in First Level
degrees) from the Faculty of Economics of the Marche Polytechnic University
in the period 2003-2005. Our findings suggest that the reform produced a
differentiated effect on courses with different characteristics. In those courses
in which before the reform the workload was much higher than that imposed
by law (250 hours), such as Mathematics, Private Law and Economics, the
reform produced a significant reduction in workload. In such courses the
reform also produced a reduction in the likelihood of failing the exams and
an increase in passing them in the first year. Since the average grade did not
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increase in such courses after the reform, we think that the last two effects
were directly produced by the reduced workload and simplification of the
courses. By contrast, in courses that were relatively simple also before the
reform, in terms of required workload and likelihood of failing, the reform
mainly produced grade inflation, i.e. teachers increased the average grade
irrespective of any change in course workload.
Therefore, it appears that all these changes have gone in the direction
of a reduction in drop-out rates, since exam failures may be an important
motivation for interrupting university studies, and in graduation times, as
first year exams are those that generally pose major problems to students.
In other words, the reform might attain the objectives for which it was in-
troduced. However, what will be the effects on graduates when they enter
the labour market?
It is perhaps too early to evaluate the effect of the ‘3+2’ reform on new
graduates’ employment outcomes, since only a few cohorts of students en-
rolled after the reform and have had the time to complete their studies and
enter the labour market. However, based on the empirical evidence on this
paper, as a suggestion for future research we put forward some possible labour
market consequences of the reform, which could be tested when data on new
graduates’ employment become available. Up to now, from our study we
have observed three kinds of effects of the reform: 1) reduction of course
workload; 2) grade inflation; 3) increase in the probability of passing exams.
In short, obtaining an undergraduate degree has become easier.
What does economic theory predict as possible consequences of this fact?
According to the signalling theory (Spence, 1973) a reduction in the effort
required to pass exams reduces the cost for low ability students (who have
greater costs per unit of effort) to acquire higher education and raises their
relative convenience of getting a university degree compared to high ability
students. This implies an increase in the labour market of the quantity
of low ability graduates with negative consequences on average returns to
education, in the case of heterogeneity of returns to education according to
ability. On the other hand, firms, which might use a degree qualification as
a means to screen job applicants, will see an inflation of graduates in the
labour market and will find more difficult to select high ability applicants. A
further consequence is that students might decide to go on for postgraduate
education, such as Second Level degrees, in order to signal their ability. And
this seems to have been the case. Data collected by Almalaurea, a consortium
of 44 Italian universities, show that about 76% of First Level degree graduates
in 2004 planned to go for postgraduate studies (34% of whom planned to
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enrol in Second Level degrees).37 However, only increasing the degree of
selectivity of Second Level degrees (compared to First Level degrees) high
ability students will succeed in signaling their ‘type’ and firms will be able
to select more able and competent individuals to fill high qualified positions.
It must be noted that also the other main competitive theory of education
existing in the domain of economics, the human capital theory hypothesis
(Becker, 1964), produces similar predictions. A reduction of workload due to
simplification of course programmes might lead to a reduction of the amount
of knowledge and skills (i.e. human capital) that graduates acquire during
their studies, with negative consequences on employers who will dispose of
younger but probably less skilled graduates than in the past. Also in this
case, an excessive simplification of university courses might make students
feel inadequate for the labour market and induce them to go for postgraduate
education. Post-reform graduates might also suffer from a reduction in the
economic returns to their degrees, as compared to pre-reform graduates, due
to their reduced amount of skills.
We hope to see in the recent future an increase in studies analysing univer-
sity students’ outcomes, both academic and occupational, using data from
several Italian universities or the whole university system. Such evidence
might be extremely useful to fully evaluate the effects produced by the ‘3+2’
reform and eventually make some adjustments in case they are needed to
improve the current university system.
37Source: www.almalaurea.it
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Appendix A: Probability to switch to the new regime
In this Appendix we show the results of a probit model of the probability
that a pre-reform student chooses to opt for the new First Level degree
programmes. During the transitory phase from the old system to the new
one, universities had to complete degree courses that were still running and
to grant students the opportunity to opt for the new system. The aim of the
analysis is to find if there are any correlations between students’ individual
and academic characteristics and the probability of re-enrolling in the new,
shorter, degree courses.
We refer to all those students who got their degree (old or new) from the
Faculty of Economics of the Marche Polytechnic University, in the 2003-2005
period, enrolled between 1999 and 2000. Our sample includes 516 students,
475 of them re-enrolled in the new system while only 41 remained in the
4-year courses. In this analysis, unlike for the PS matching analysis, we
included individuals with missing values in specific variables in order not to
reduce the sample size too much.
Table 12 reports the results from the probit model where the dependent
variable is the probability of opting for one of the new degree courses. Results
show that male students, students with lower Maturita` grades and those who
enrolled for the first time in the year before the introduction of the reform
(2000) were more likely to choose a shorter degree programme.
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Table 12: Pre-reform students’ probabilities to switch to (3-year)
First Level degrees
Variables Marg. Eff Std. Error
Gender (men)
women -0.034 * 0.023
Age at the enrolment (less than 19)
19 0.041 0.026
20 0.009 0.049
21 (dropped)(a)
22 o more -0.145 0.097
School (technical)
accounting 0.019 0.058
liceo classico -0.022 0.083
liceo scientifico -0.008 0.057
languages, arts, education 0.024 0.046
Maturita` grade -0.003 * 0.002
Father’s education (no or elementary school)
lower secondary school -0.027 0.035
higher secondary school -0.033 0.043
degree -0.063 0.070
missing -0.147 0.176
Mother’s education (no or elementary school)
lower secondary school 0.008 0.032
higher secondary school -0.016 0.043
degree -0.099 0.087
missing (dropped)
Father’s occupation (entrepreneur, manager)
independent worker -0.037 0.053
white collar -0.004 0.035
blue collar -0.030 0.057
other -0.038 0.040
missing -0.004 0.052
Mother’s occupation (entrepreneur, manager)
independent worker -0.023 0.076
white collar 0.009 0.046
blue collar 0.002 0.050
housekeeper -0.006 0.047
other 0.057 0.041
missing 0.040 0.055
Year of enrolment (1999)
2000 0.152 *** 0.018
Resident in Ancona province (no)
yes 0.043 0.039
N. obs 516
Pseudo R2 0.220
Prob > χ2 0.000
Source: Marche Polytechnic University administrative data.
Note. Reference categories for categorical variables are reported in brackets. (a) Categorical variables
that corresponds to empty cells or are perfectly collinear to other variables are dropped from the analysis.
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Appendix B: Diagnostics
Table 13: PSM Diagnostics - Mathematics
methods/ Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 P > Chi2 % out of % bias
variables before(a) after(b) after(c) support(d) reduction(e)
Workload
radius/all 0.143 0.041 0.994 18.950 52.875
kernel/all 0.143 0.017 0.955 0.000 49.592
radius/sig 0.113 0.021 0.765 19.020 39.988
kernel/sig 0.113 0.012 0.984 0.000 50.949
Grade
radius/all 0.141 0.035 0.953 26.453 37.988
kernel/all 0.141 0.015 0.942 0.000 43.727
radius/sig 0.106 0.016 0.995 29.023 53.557
kernel/sig 0.106 0.011 0.975 0.000 60.280
Probability of one or more fails
radius/all 0.122 0.034 0.943 26.238 41.711
kernel/all 0.122 0.014 0.971 0.000 43.061
radius/sig 0.106 0.023 1.000 23.601 61.867
kernel/sig 0.106 0.010 0.970 0.000 60.106
Probability of success in the first year
radius/all 0.139 0.056 0.771 21.802 51.310
kernel/all 0.139 0.016 0.917 0.000 44.255
radius/sig 0.109 0.016 0.990 22.989 54.020
kernel/sig 0.109 0.010 0.976 0.000 52.582
Note. (a) Pseudo R2 of the probit model of the treatment status before matching suggesting how well
the covariates (X) used for matching treated with control units predict the probability of enrolling at
university after the 2001 reform.
(b) Pseudo R2 of the probit model of the treatment status estimated on the matched sample, suggesting
how well PSM balance the covariates between the two samples of treated and control individuals.
(c) Test for the joint significance of all covariates (except the constant) in the probit model. Lack of
joint significance indicates that covariates are well balanced in the two samples of treated and control
individuals.
(d) It is the percentage of treated units falling out of the common support, i.e. with a PS less than the
minimum or greater than the maximum of the propensity scores of control units giving an indication of
the problem of lack of common support.
(e) It is the percentage reduction in the median absolute standardized bias before and after matching,
with median taken over all regressors used to compute the PS. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985),
the standardized bias before and after matching for the covariate X, labelled as Bbm(X) and Bam(X)
respectively, are defined as:
Bbm(X) =
X1−X0√
[V1(X)+V0(X)]/2
, Bam(X) =
X1M−X0M√
[V1(X)+V0(X)]/2
where X0 and X1 are means of the X covariate in the full samples of treated and untreated individuals,
while X0M and X1M are the means of the X covariate in the matched samples of treated and control
individuals, respectively, and V1(X) and V0(X) are the variances of X in the full treated and control
groups.
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Table 14: PSM Diagnostics - Private Law
methods/ Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 P > Chi2 % out of % bias
variables before(a) after(b) after(c) support(d) reduction(e)
Workload
radius/all 0.115 0.024 0.999 10.305 49.313
kernel/all 0.115 0.008 1.000 0.000 73.505
radius/sig 0.092 0.008 1.000 4.151 75.198
kernel/sig 0.092 0.005 1.000 0.000 71.927
Grade
radius/all 0.120 0.022 0.999 6.630 67.196
kernel/all 0.120 0.009 1.000 0.000 71.937
radius/sig 0.100 0.011 1.000 6.000 71.897
kernel/sig 0.100 0.005 1.000 0.000 81.689
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.112 0.012 1.000 9.121 62.256
kernel/all 0.112 0.008 1.000 0.000 75.527
radius/sig 0.095 0.008 1.000 8.626 78.500
kernel/sig 0.095 0.005 1.000 0.000 72.986
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.116 0.023 0.999 9.125 45.809
kernel/all 0.116 0.008 1.000 0.000 75.696
radius/sig 0.094 0.008 1.000 7.143 80.020
kernel/sig 0.094 0.006 1.000 0.000 75.268
Note. See Table 13.
Table 15: PSM Diagnostics - Economics
methods/ Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 P > Chi2 % out of % bias
variables before(a) after(b) after(c) support(d) reduction(e)
Workload
radius/all 0.157 0.030 0.999 19.283 34.807
kernel/all 0.157 0.013 1.000 0.000 69.923
radius/sig 0.133 0.014 1.000 10.132 56.037
kernel/sig 0.133 0.010 1.000 0.000 62.166
Grade
radius/all 0.162 0.033 0.997 14.350 53.488
kernel/all 0.162 0.013 1.000 0.000 69.223
radius/sig 0.132 0.027 0.982 17.181 34.494
kernel/sig 0.132 0.010 1.000 0.000 60.305
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.154 0.027 0.999 12.595 57.087
kernel/all 0.154 0.015 1.000 0.000 69.273
radius/sig 0.136 0.026 0.967 15.672 52.116
kernel/sig 0.136 0.013 0.999 0.000 62.348
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.155 0.033 0.997 15.695 58.245
kernel/all 0.155 0.013 1.000 0.000 59.676
radius/sig 0.129 0.029 0.964 10.132 25.396
kernel/sig 0.129 0.010 1.000 0.000 54.591
Note. See Table 13.
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Table 16: PSM Diagnostics - Accounting
methods/ Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 P > Chi2 % out of % bias
variables before(a) after(b) after(c) support(d) reduction(e)
Workload
radius/all 0.123 0.015 1.000 8.882 65.563
kernel/all 0.123 0.011 1.000 0.000 69.507
radius/sig 0.096 0.011 1.000 3.257 57.105
kernel/sig 0.096 0.006 1.000 0.000 73.121
Grade
radius/all 0.129 0.021 0.999 11.842 62.818
kernel/all 0.129 0.011 1.000 0.000 73.788
radius/sig 0.101 0.013 0.999 5.537 61.471
kernel/sig 0.101 0.006 1.000 0.000 76.299
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.114 0.021 0.996 6.287 56.328
kernel/all 0.114 0.009 1.000 0.000 76.506
radius/sig 0.098 0.016 0.987 5.540 55.700
kernel/sig 0.098 0.006 1.000 0.000 67.462
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.123 0.017 1.000 8.553 60.002
kernel/all 0.123 0.011 1.000 0.000 64.905
radius/sig 0.096 0.008 1.000 6.515 65.647
kernel/sig 0.096 0.006 1.000 0.000 77.419
Note. See Table 13.
Table 17: PSM Diagnostics - Economic History
methods/ Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 P > Chi2 % out of % bias
variables before(a) after(b) after(c) support(d) reduction(e)
Workload
radius/all 0.107 0.016 1.000 12.705 60.382
kernel/all 0.107 0.010 1.000 0.000 67.041
radius/sig 0.096 0.014 0.997 7.184 41.124
kernel/sig 0.096 0.007 1.000 0.000 72.230
Grade
radius/all 0.113 0.022 0.995 9.302 45.027
kernel/all 0.113 0.010 1.000 0.000 65.792
radius/sig 0.100 0.014 0.997 6.897 65.609
kernel/sig 0.100 0.007 1.000 0.000 77.619
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.106 0.016 1.000 7.178 41.563
kernel/all 0.106 0.009 1.000 0.000 65.103
radius/sig 0.101 0.010 1.000 8.759 43.545
kernel/sig 0.101 0.007 1.000 0.000 73.357
Probability of passing in the first year
radius/all 0.108 0.017 1.000 9.538 51.748
kernel/all 0.108 0.011 1.000 0.000 63.209
radius/sig 0.096 0.014 0.996 6.571 58.710
kernel/sig 0.096 0.007 1.000 0.000 76.495
Note. See Table 13.
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Table 18: PSM Diagnostics - All 1st year exams
methods/ Pseudo R2 Pseudo R2 P > Chi2 % out of % bias
variables before(a) after(b) after(c) support(d) reduction(e)
Workload
radius/all 0.113 0.016 1.000 7.872 72.881
kernel/all 0.113 0.010 1.000 0.000 71.232
radius/sig 0.100 0.006 1.000 6.916 73.664
kernel/sig 0.100 0.007 1.000 0.000 70.501
Grade
radius/all 0.115 0.022 0.997 9.329 57.887
kernel/all 0.115 0.010 1.000 0.000 68.728
radius/sig 0.101 0.013 0.999 6.628 42.937
kernel/sig 0.101 0.007 1.000 0.000 68.105
Total number of failures
radius/all 0.106 0.016 1.000 7.733 41.563
kernel/all 0.106 0.009 1.000 0.000 65.103
radius/sig 0.101 0.010 1.000 8.759 43.545
kernel/sig 0.101 0.007 1.000 0.000 73.357
N. of exams passed in the first year
radius/all 0.112 0.013 1.000 9.302 64.651
kernel/all 0.112 0.011 1.000 0.000 66.770
radius/sig 0.099 0.009 1.000 12.356 50.880
kernel/sig 0.099 0.007 1.000 0.000 71.344
Note. See Table 13.
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Appendix C: Analysis restricted to students passing
exams during the first year
Table 19: PSM - Exam passed during the first year - Mathematics
methods/ treated untr.
variables ATT std.err (a) avg(b) avg(c) n. obs.
Workload
radius/all -33.3 23.8 251 285 440
kernel/all -37.4 * 19.3 240 277 440
radius/sig -22.9 23.7 234 257 444
kernel/sig -38.2 * 20.1 239 277 444
Grade
radius/all 0.93 0.58 25.25 24.31 439
kernel/all 0.64 0.41 25.06 24.41 439
radius/sig 0.81 0.56 25.07 24.26 443
kernel/sig 0.65 * 0.37 25.04 24.39 443
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.10 0.08 0.19 0.29 444
kernel/all -0.06 0.07 0.20 0.26 444
radius/sig -0.06 0.08 0.20 0.26 448
kernel/sig -0.07 0.07 0.20 0.27 448
Note. See Table 6. Analysis limited to students who passed the exam during the first year. PSM
diagnostics are available from the authors upon request.
Table 20: PSM - Exam passed during the first year - Private Law
methods/ treated untr.
variables ATT std.err (a) avg(b) avg(c) n. obs.
Workload
radius/all -79.8 *** 29.6 240 320 377
kernel/all -67.9 *** 20.6 241 309 377
radius/sig -79.1 *** 25.2 247 326 381
kernel/sig -73.1 *** 17.3 241 315 381
Grade
radius/all 0.45 0.61 25.94 25.49 377
kernel/all 0.28 0.44 25.88 25.60 377
radius/sig 0.34 0.58 25.87 25.53 381
kernel/sig 0.57 0.44 25.88 25.31 381
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.06 383
kernel/all 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 383
radius/sig -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.11 387
kernel/sig -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 387
Note. See Table 6. Analysis limited to students who passed the exam during the first year. PSM
diagnostics are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 21: PSM - Exam passed during the first year - Economics
methods/ treated untr.
variables ATT std.err (a) avg(b) avg(c) n. obs.
Workload
radius/all -23.5 27.6 251 275 328
kernel/all -25.8 19.6 246 272 328
radius/sig -37.6 23.8 247 284 336
kernel/sig -31.5 * 16.7 246 278 336
Grade
radius/all 0.68 0.69 26.28 25.60 333
kernel/all 0.46 0.50 26.34 25.88 333
radius/sig 0.43 0.62 26.53 26.10 341
kernel/sig 0.32 0.44 26.37 26.06 341
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all 0.01 0.09 0.25 0.24 333
kernel/all -0.05 0.07 0.24 0.29 333
radius/sig -0.03 0.08 0.24 0.27 341
kernel/sig -0.04 0.06 0.24 0.28 341
Note. See Table 6. Analysis limited to students who passed the exam during the first year. PSM
diagnostics are available from the authors upon request.
Table 22: PSM - Exam passed during the first year - Accounting
methods/ treated untr.
variables ATT std.err (a) avg(b) avg(c) n. obs.
Workload
radius/all 3.8 13.3 212 209 526
kernel/all 8.4 9.9 213 205 526
radius/sig 8.2 12.0 212 204 532
kernel/sig 10.1 9.6 214 204 532
Grade
radius/all 0.59 * 0.31 27.50 26.91 527
kernel/all 0.49 ** 0.23 27.47 26.98 527
radius/sig 0.52 * 0.29 27.45 26.93 533
kernel/sig 0.51 ** 0.23 27.47 26.96 533
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 532
kernel/all -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 532
radius/sig -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.08 538
kernel/sig -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 538
Note. See Table 6. Analysis limited to students who passed the exam during the first year. PSM
diagnostics are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 23: PSM - Exam passed during the first year - Economic
History
methods/ treated untr.
variables ATT std.err (a) avg(b) avg(c) n. obs.
Workload
radius/all 4.3 9.2 175 170 600
kernel/all 1.6 7.7 172 171 600
radius/sig 0.2 9.3 170 170 609
kernel/sig -1.2 7.4 172 173 609
Grade
radius/all 0.65 * 0.37 26.48 25.83 604
kernel/all 0.66 ** 0.31 26.49 25.84 604
radius/sig 0.48 0.33 26.49 26.01 613
kernel/sig 0.57 ** 0.27 26.50 25.94 613
Probability of one or more failures
radius/all -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 612
kernel/all 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 612
radius/sig -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 621
kernel/sig 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 621
Note. See Table 6. Analysis limited to students who passed the exam during the first year. PSM
diagnostics are available from the authors upon request.
39
References
Becker, G. (1964), Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press.
Black, D. A., and Smith, J. A. (2004), ‘How robust is the evidence on
the effects of college quality? Evidence from matching’, Journal of
Econometrics, 121: 99-124.
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., and Sianesi, B. (2003), ‘Evaluating the effect of
education on earnings: models, methods and results from the National
Child Development Survey’, Journal of The Royal Statistical Society,
Series A, 168: 473-512.
Boero, G., Laureti, T. and Naylor, R. (2005), ‘An econometric analysis of
student withdrawal and progression in post-reform Italian universities’,
CRENOS Working Paper no. 2005-04.
Broccolini, C. (2005), ‘Una prima valutazione degli effetti della riforma uni-
versitaria: il caso dell’Universita` Politecnica delle Marche’, Universita`
Politecnica delle Marche, Dipartimento di Economia Working Paper
no. 244.
Broccolini, C., and Staffolani, S. (2005), ‘Riforma universitaria e perfor-
mance accademica: un’analisi empirica presso la Facolta` di Economia
dell’Universita` Politecnica delle Marche’, Universita` Politecnica delle
Marche, Dipartimento di Economia Working Paper no. 242.
Caliendo, M., and Kopeinig, S. (2005), ‘Some practical guidance for the im-
plementation of propensity score matching’, IZA DP no. 1588. Bonn:
IZA.
DiNardo, J., and Tobias, J. (2001), ‘Nonparametric density and regression
estimation’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15: 11-28.
DiPrete, T. A., and Gangl, M. (2004), ‘Assessing bias in the estimation of
causal effects: Rosenbaum bounds on matching estimators and instru-
mental variables estimation with imperfect instruments’, Wissenschaft-
szentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung (WZB), SP I 2004-101. Berlin:
WZB.
Ha¨rdle, W. K. (1991), Smoothing techniques with implementation. New
York: Springer Verlag.
Miur Cnvsu (2005), Sesto rapporto sullo stato del sistema universitario.
Roma: Miur.
40
OECD (2002), Education at a glance. Paris: OECD.
Rosenbaum, P. R. (2002), Observational studies, Second Edition. New York:
Springer.
Rosenbaum, P. R., and Rubin, D. B. (1985), ‘Constructing a control group
using multivariate matched sampling methods that incorporate the
propensity score’. The American Statistician, 39: 33-38.
Spence, M. (1973), ‘Job market signaling’, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
87: 355-374.
41
